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The Dioxin Crisis as Experiment 
To Determine Poultry-Related 
Campylobacter Enteritis
Akke Vellinga and Frank Van Loock
In June 1999, the dioxin crisis, caused by dioxin-contaminated feed components, exploded in Belgium, result-
ing in withdrawal of chicken and eggs from the market. Through the sentinel surveillance system, a decrease
in Campylobacter infections during June 1999 was noticed. A model was generated with the reports from pre-
ceding years (1994 to 1998), and a prediction of the number of infections in 1999 was calculated. The model
shows a significant decline (40%) in the number of infections, mainly because of the withdrawal of poultry.
The use of a disaster as an epidemiologic tool offers a unique opportunity to observe exceptional changes in
the occurrence of infections or other diseases.
n 1999, Belgium had a dioxin crisis caused by dioxin-con-
taminated feed being fed to livestock (1,2). The problem
started at the end of January, when contaminated feed was pro-
cessed; however, official notification of the crisis did not occur
until the end of May (3). The source of the contamination was
a fat-rendering company, where transformer oil with high lev-
els of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and dioxins was used
to manufacture animal foods. On May 28 (week 21), Belgian
authorities ordered the withdrawal from sale of Belgian poultry
and eggs; other European countries and Russia followed suit.
On June 2, the European Community widened the ban and
ordered the destruction of all food items containing >2% egg
product and food containing chicken produced from January
15 to June 1 from infected farms (3). On June 4, 1999, the Bel-
gian government issued a commerce embargo of meat products
(pork and beef) with a minimum of 25% fat content, not appli-
cable for dairy products. Meat was not withdrawn from sale.
In Belgium, a surveillance system of sentinel (n=127) and
reference (n=38) laboratories, set up in 1983, reports on a vol-
untary basis on a list of organisms, including Campylobacter.
Of all recognized private and hospital laboratories, 46% con-
tribute to the surveillance system, which covers 35 of Bel-
gium's 43 districts (4). 
The number of registered  Campylobacter infections
increased from 2,534 cases in 1985 to 6,610 cases in 1998 and
6,521 in 1999. In Belgium, Campylobacter enteritis (campylo-
bacteriosis) is mainly caused by Campylobacter jejuni (80% of
the isolates) and C. coli (12%) (4). 
Campylobacteriosis is a common form of infective diarrhea
in industrialized countries; most infections are sporadic, and
80% are believed to be foodborne (5,6). Campylobacter can be
isolated from many species of wild and domesticated animals,
which are mainly asymptomatic carriers. Of farm animals,
poultry and pigs are most frequently infected (5,7). Various
risk factors have been suggested on the basis of case-control
studies and outbreak investigations, including handling
chicken (8-10); eating not fully cooked chicken (11-13); eating
commercially prepared chicken (13,14), sausages (10), and
barbecue (10,15,16); exposure to farm or domesticated animals
(10-13); or consumption of raw milk (12,13,16). 
The dioxin crisis had implications for public health on
more levels than the direct health effects of dioxin (17).
Whereas the level of dioxin contamination and the health out-
comes require research projects over long periods, one of the
direct effects of this crisis could be noticed in the number of
Campylobacter infections. This unique event made it possible
to investigate the withdrawal of particular food products from
the market and their contribution to campylobacteriosis.
Methods
To estimate the effect of the dioxin crisis on the number of
Campylobacter infections, a model was designed by which the
number of expected cases for 1999 could be calculated. This
model was based on the data collected by the sentinel labora-
tory surveillance network from 1994 to 1998. The cumulative
numbers per week were used to drive a monthly chronologic
series for 1994 to 1998 and modeled according to the Fourier
transformation (18,19). This procedure explains the cyclic pat-
terns of data by spectral analysis; a complex time series with
cyclic components is decomposed into sine and cosine terms
describing the seasonal changes and a linear term to identify
the trend (Figure 1). 
The final model has three cyclical terms (52, 26, and 13
weeks), i.e., a strong yearly variation and two harmonics at the
half and quarter year.
The linear trend shows a yearly increase from 1994 to
1998, with a slope of 15%. When the cyclical contributions are
included, r2=0.86, that is, 86% of the variation in the number
of the  Campylobacter infections can be explained by the
model. The epidemic threshold is set at a distance of 1.96 stan-
dard deviations (SD); (95% confidence interval [CI]), which
has shown to be useful for distinguishing epidemic increases
from random variation (18), or (as for the dioxin crisis) excep-
tional, epidemic decrease. Outbreaks over the years were
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smoothed for this calculation. Figure 2 shows the model,
including the 95% CI and the actual numbers by which it was
calculated. Poultry production per workday for 1998 and 1999
is also shown, representing the production per workday in indi-
ces with 1995 as reference year (1995 = 100) (20).
Age and gender distribution during the crisis was compared
with the monthly distribution of age and gender in previous
years. The model was made with MS Excel 2000; SPSS ver-
sion 9.0 was used to compare distributions.
Results
Figure 2 shows the model, including the 95% CI as calcu-
lated from the numbers in the previous years during a period of
20 weeks (middle of April to the end of August, weeks 15 to
35) as well as the actual count for this period in 1999. The
number of Campylobacter infections analyzed by the sentinel
laboratory surveillance network fit the 95% CI except during
the dioxin crisis (from week 21), when all poultry and eggs
were taken off the supermarket shelves. The number of
Campylobacter infections from week 23 to week 26 in 1999 is
on average 94 cases per week or almost 40% lower than the
expected average of 153 cases per week (SDmodel=15 cases/
week; SD = standard deviation). Overall, for the month of June
(week 23 to 26), the expected number of infections was 643
(STmodel=61 cases/month) while the actual number of cases in
1999 was 375. The monthly calculated numbers follow the
same trend as Campylobacter infections in 1999 and a similar
decrease in numbers during the dioxin crisis. After 4 weeks,
the ban was lifted, and the number of Campylobacter infec-
tions returned to the interval calculated by the model. Poultry
production, even though over a longer period, also returned to
levels comparable with the month of the previous year (1998).
There was no difference in age or gender distribution of
Campylobacter infections during the crisis compared with the
rest of the year.
Discussion
The impact of the dioxin crisis can be detected in various
disciplines. The economic impact is probably the easiest to
determine, as this aspect is data driven. However, the dioxin
crisis had a tremendous impact on health and health-related
matters, including food consumption. The sudden change in
food consumption, related to the withdrawal of poultry and
eggs, had an immediate effect on the number of foodborne dis-
eases, e.g., Campylobacter. The fitted model shows an unex-
pected decline in June 1999. Even though the decline in
numbers is not exceptional, the moment at which this happens
is. Looking at other declines in the number of Campylobacter
infections, as in February 1996 or February 1997, these happen
during a downward trend in numbers, while the drop in June
1999 occurs when numbers would normally be increasing.
The decline in campylobacteriosis and the lack of poultry
in shops lasted 4 weeks, exactly the period from seizing all
Belgian chicken and egg products from the supermarket
shelves until the return of these items. This supports a direct
link and contradicts a possible “ecological fallacy” as the time
frame, which has an abrupt beginning and end, is similar for
both the dioxin crisis and the decline in number of Campylo-
bacter infections (21). During this period no other events pos-
sibly explaining the decline in numbers are known to have
occurred. A major concern with ecologic studies is often the
flue line (generally, the geographic boundaries of the occur-
rence of the risk factor and the occurrence of the illness), as
was the case in the European study of the association between
olive oil and cancer (22). The dioxin crisis differs from the
commonly analyzed ecologic studies in this geographic aspect,
since the borders of the impact of the dioxin crisis are the same
as the borders of a well-established surveillance system.
Campylobacter is associated with several risk factors and
risk behaviors, such as contact with farm and domesticated ani-
mals (mainly cats and kittens) (10-12) or recent history of anti-
biotic use (14). However, the dioxin crisis would not have an
immediate effect on these factors, as it was primarily a food
scare. Drinking raw milk, occasionally found to be a risk factor
(12,16), is also unlikely to have contributed to the decline in
numbers since milk products were not taken off the shelves. 
Figure 1. Campylobacteriosis in Belgium from 1994 through 1998, fit of
the model.
Figure 2. Campylobacteriosis in Belgium at period of dioxin crisis,
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Meat, in particular pork prepared on the barbecue, is gener-
ally accepted to be an important risk factor (10,16). Pork meat
is associated with C. coli, which accounted for 12% (in 1998)
and 21% (in 1999) of all Campylobacter infections (4). Meat
remained available during the crisis, which might explain the
small increase in  C. coli infections, as it is imaginable that
chicken, which is the main source of C. jejuni infections, was
replaced by pork during the crisis. 
Eggs were not on sale during the crisis, but they are gener-
ally not associated with Campylobacter contamination. (A pos-
sible link of eggs with  Salmonella infections will be
examined.)
The withdrawal of chicken and all related products from
the supermarket during the dioxin crisis is the most likely rea-
son for the sudden decline in  Campylobacter infections.
Chicken is found to be the principal source of infection in most
case-control studies (11,13,14,16). In Seattle, rare, raw, and
cooked chicken were all significantly associated with Campy-
lobacter infection (8). Undercooked chicken was found to be a
risk factor in a Colorado study (12). Handling raw and even
frozen chicken, possibly because of cross-contamination in the
kitchen, has also been significantly associated with campylo-
bacteriosis (10). As all Belgian poultry was withdrawn, our
data allow an estimation of the number of  Campylobacter
infections directly related to poultry. 
The decline in the number of Campylobacter infections in
Belgium by 40% was due to the withdrawal of Belgian poultry
from the market. In 1999, 199,251 tons of poultry meat was
available for human consumption; 81,261 tons (41%) was
imported (23). Foreign poultry remained available on the mar-
ket. 
According to a marketing bureau that investigates trends in
shopping behavior of 3,000 families in Belgium, eating habits
have changed little because of the dioxin crisis (24); moreover,
the overall purchase of poultry in 1999 increased by almost
9%. However, a shift was seen in the quality of the poultry
sold; after the crisis, consumers preferred chicken with some
sort of quality label, even though the current labels do not spe-
cifically address contamination issues.
Besides the 40% decrease in  Campylobacter infections
during the dioxin crisis, this experiment also highlights the
remaining baseline of 60%, averaging 75 infections a month.
According to an analysis of foodborne disease information in
the United States (1999), only 80% of the Campylobacter spp.
infections are estimated to be foodborne (5). Furthermore, as
only Belgian chicken was banned and non-Belgian poultry was
still on sale, a number of poultry-related infections are still
present in the reported numbers. With at least 40% of the
Campylobacter infections in Belgium explained by poultry and
20% by non-foodborne causes, the source of the remaining
infections should be further explored and investigated. 
The use of a disaster as an epidemiologic tool offers a
unique opportunity to observe exceptional changes in the
occurrence of infections or other diseases. The causes or conse-
quences of the crisis can serve as treatment in an uncontrolled
natural experiment. The dioxin crisis as experiment showed
that >40% of the Campylobacter infections can be attributed to
poultry.
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